Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Infection in Swine Herds, Manitoba, Canada by Pasma, Tim & Joseph, Tomy
Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Infection 
in Swine Herds, 
Manitoba, Canada
Tim Pasma and Tomy Joseph
In Manitoba, Canada, several swine herds were infect-
ed by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in the summer of 2009. 
Results of several investigations concluded that outbreaks 
of infection with this virus are similar in duration to out-
breaks of infections with swine inﬂ  uenza viruses A (H1N1) 
and A (H3N2).
O
n April 21, 2009, the US Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention announced the ﬁ  nding of a novel 
strain of inﬂ  uenza virus A (H1N1), now known as pandem-
ic (H1N1) 2009 virus, in 2 children in southern California 
(1). By June 11, this virus had spread so quickly and exten-
sively among humans that the World Health Organization 
declared a phase 6 pandemic (2). The disease in humans 
is a self-limiting, uncomplicated respiratory illness with 
fever; however, severe disease and deaths have occurred 
(3). Clinical signs in humans are generally mild and include 
fever, slight cough, sneezing, and nasal discharge. Vomit-
ing and diarrhea also have been reported in up to 38% of 
cases (3).
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus also has affected swine. 
On May 2, 2009, the virus was isolated from a swine herd 
in Alberta, Canada (4). The disease in swine has been re-
ported as mild in ﬁ  eld and experimental conditions. Clini-
cal signs in pigs include fever, slight cough, sneezing, and 
nasal discharge. Diarrhea was also reported in experimen-
tally infected pigs; however, this symptom may have been 
secondary to the inﬂ  uenza infection (5). In experimental 
infection of pigs, clinical signs peaked on days 4–5 post-
infection (5).
In Manitoba, Canada, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
was ﬁ  rst detected in a swine herd on June 30, 2009. During 
the following months, more outbreaks in Manitoba were re-
ported in farrowing, nursery, and ﬁ  nishing herds. Our study 
aimed to determine the length of time that virus was shed 
in swine herds after a ﬁ  eld outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009.
The Study
We studied 5 herds in which pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
was diagnosed. We collected information about the pro-
duction type and number of animals housed in the barn, 
inﬂ  uenza vaccination status of the herd, date of inﬂ  uenza-
like illness in any barn employees before the outbreak, date 
of the outbreak as determined by onset of clinical signs, 
and sampling date and number of positive swabs. In each 
herd, 32 nasal swabs were taken from randomly selected 
pigs as soon as possible after diagnosis. The procedure was 
repeated every 7 days until all the samples tested showed 
negative results.
Nasal swabbing was performed by using a polyester 
swab with a plastic handle that was placed in a viral trans-
port medium (Starswab Multitrans Collection & Trans-
port System; Starplex Scientiﬁ  c Inc, Etobicoke, Ontario, 
Canada). The swabs were refrigerated and submitted to 
the Veterinary Services Diagnostic Laboratory at Mani-
toba Agriculture, Food and Rural Initiatives (Winnipeg, 
Manitoba, Canada). Samples were tested by using a ge-
neric real-time PCR speciﬁ  c for the genomic RNA seg-
ment 7 (matrix gene) of the inﬂ  uenza A virus provided 
by the National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (Win-
nipeg, Manitoba, Canada) (3) and an H1 differential PCR 
(6) provided by the National Microbiology Laboratory 
(Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada).
We tested 5 herds (herds A–E) in which pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus was diagnosed (Table). Herds A, B, 
and D were ﬁ  nishing herds, herd C was a nursery herd, and 
herd E was a farrowing herd. Herd sizes ranged from 850 
to 4,100 pigs. For herds C and D, human illness 16–92 days 
before the outbreak was reported. The owners of herds A 
and B reported that they received pigs from a previously 
infected herd. For persons in contact with herd E, no ill 
persons were reported, and no pigs from previously affect-
ed herds were received before the outbreak. Pigs in herd E 
were vaccinated for swine inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) and (H3N2) 
viruses with an autogenous vaccine.
Clinical signs in pigs were reported to be mild, with 
no deaths. However, herd D, co-infected with porcine re-
productive and respiratory syndrome virus, Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae, and porcine circovirus, reported a 1% out-
break-associated death rate. No vomiting or diarrhea was 
reported in any pigs infected with the virus.
Nasal swabbing of the pigs demonstrated that pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 virus was no longer detected in swine 
10–20 days after clinical signs appeared. When tested again 
the week before slaughter (day 67), herd B showed no evi-
dence of virus shedding.
Conclusions
We demonstrated that ﬁ  eld infections of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 in swine are similar in duration to infec-
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tions with other swine inﬂ  uenza viruses. In the herds stud-
ied, the virus caused mild illness identical to the clinical 
signs typical of swine inﬂ  uenza (7). Sampling by nasal 
swab indicated that pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus sheds 
for up to 20 days after clinical signs appear. Our ﬁ  ndings 
support the laboratory work of Lange et al., who estab-
lished that pigs experimentally infected with this strain 
intermittently shed the virus 6–11 days postinfection and 
ceased excretion by day 11 (5). Shedding of the circu-
lating strains of swine inﬂ  uenza in nasal secretions stops 
by 5–7 days postinfection (7–9). Our study also indicates 
that autogenous vaccine prepared with circulating H1N1 
subtype may not protect pigs from pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 infection.
Our study has several limitations. Other swine viruses, 
such as porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome 
virus, may interfere with the detection of swine inﬂ  uenza 
viruses from nasal swabs (8), and we did not test for other 
viruses. In addition, the virus can be difﬁ  cult to diagnose in 
nursery pigs because of maternal antibodies and low levels 
of exposure (8), which may have affected the samples from 
the nursery herd. The small sample size and the unknown 
sensitivity of the PCR in this speciﬁ  c application also limit 
the ﬁ  ndings of our study.
The swine herds we studied quickly cleared the virus 
after infection. This study supports the recommendations 
developed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (10) 
and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) (11). 
These guidelines state that pigs infected with pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus should be managed similarly to herds 
infected with any swine inﬂ  uenza virus. On the basis of our 
study ﬁ  ndings, restrictions of trade or slaughter of pigs as a 
public health intervention are irrational actions.
Only 10 countries have reported pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 infection in commercial swine to the OIE (12). Wheth-
er pandemic (H1N1) 2009 will become established in swine 
populations worldwide remains to be seen. All countries 
should implement vigilant surveillance for, and monitor for 
changes in the structure and behavior of, the virus.
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